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WHAT MAKES FOR MORE OR LESS POWERFUL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS? 
STEPHEN GARDBAUM* 
It is sometimes suggested that one or another constitutional or supreme 
court (for example, the U.S., Indian, or German) is the “most powerful in 
the world.”  And yet it is often far from clear what the measure of power is 
or should be, what the sources of judicial power are under the given 
measure, and what explains why some courts are more powerful than others.  
Is strength mostly a function of formal powers, so that, for example, a court 
with the authority to invalidate a constitutional amendment on substantive 
grounds is ipso facto more powerful than one that may only invalidate 
statutes, which in turn is more powerful than a court that can do neither?  
Yet, both the U.S. and Japanese supreme courts are in this middle category; 
indeed they have roughly similar sets of legal powers overall, but while the 
former is often considered among the most powerful courts in the world, the 
latter is often considered among the weakest.  Thus, it seems clear that 
formal powers do not tell the whole story, but what part do they play, if any, 
and what else helps to fill in the picture?  Although looking to how courts 
actually use their legal powers is obviously also relevant, it too falls short.  
For what we are additionally in search of are factors that help to explain 
why, for example, the U.S. and Japanese courts use their powers in such 
different ways. 
This Article seeks to shed light on all three parts of the uncertainty: the 
measure; sources; and explanation of judicial power.  It begins by proposing 
that the proper measure of the power of a constitutional court is its 
consequential nature as an institutional actor in terms of affecting the 
outcomes of important constitutional and political issues.  Although more 
diffuse and harder to quantify, this conception of judicial power is more 
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inclusive and realistically nuanced than commonly employed uni-
dimensional alternatives, such as international influence or strike-down 
rate.  The Article next argues that the consequential nature of a 
constitutional court is a function of three broad variables: formal rules and 
powers, legal and judicial practice, and the immediate electoral and 
political context in which it operates.  Through a process of mutual 
interaction, each of these three helps to shape and constitute the more 
specific components of a court’s institutional power, which include the 
nature, scope, and content of the constitution it enforces, the jurisdictional 
and remedial powers it has and employs, the ease or difficulty of 
constitutional amendment, and its composition and tenure.  Moving from 
measuring to explaining the strength or weakness of constitutional courts, 
the Article next identifies and discusses three explanatory variables: 
deliberate constitutional design choices, legal culture, and general or 
structural political context.  The Article concludes with case studies of the 
supreme courts of India and Japan that illustrate the role and interaction of 
these multidimensional evidentiary and explanatory factors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is sometimes suggested that one or another constitutional or supreme 
court—for example, the Indian,1 U.S.,2 or German3—is the “most powerful 
in the world.”  And yet it is far from clear (a) what such power or “strength” 
of courts consists in; i.e., what measure, metric, criterion, conception, test, 
or indicia of power or strength is (usually implicitly) employed,4 (b) what 
the sources or components of judicial power are under the given measure, 
and (c) what explains why some courts are more powerful than others.  Is 
strength exclusively or mostly a function of formal legal powers, so that, for 
example, a court with the authority to invalidate a constitutional amendment 
on substantive grounds is ipso facto more powerful than one that may only 
invalidate statutes, which in turn is more powerful than a court that can do 
neither?  Yet, both the U.S. and Japanese supreme courts are in this middle 
category; indeed they have roughly similar sets of legal powers overall, but 
while the former is often considered among the most powerful courts in the 
world, the latter is often considered among the weakest.5  Thus, it seems clear 
that formal powers do not tell the whole story, but what part do they play, if 
any, and what else helps to fill in the picture?  Although looking to how 
courts actually use their legal powers is obviously also relevant, it too falls 
short of fully completing the picture.  For what we are additionally in search 
of are factors that help to explain why, for example, the U.S. and Japanese 
courts use their powers in such different ways. 
This Article seeks to shed light on all three uncertainties surrounding 
claims as to the overall strength or weakness of constitutional courts: the 
 
 1.  Clark D. Cunningham, The World’s Most Powerful Court: Finding the Roots of India’s Public 
Interest Litigation Revolution in the Hussainara Khatoon Prisoners Case, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND 
JUSTICE: STRUGGLES FOR A NEW SOCIAL ORDER 83–96 (S.P. Sathe ed., 2003); S.P. Sathe, Judicial 
Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 29, 87 (2001) (“The Supreme Court of India 
has become the most powerful apex court in the world.”). 
 2.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 1 (2d ed. 1962) (“The least dangerous branch of the American government is the most 
extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known.”). 
 3.  Peter E. Quint, The Most Extraordinarily Powerful Court of Law the World has Ever Known? 
– Judicial Review in the United States and Germany, 65 MD. L. REV. 152, 153 (2006) (“[T]he 
contemporary observer might well ask whether the German Constitutional Court has surpassed the 
American Supreme Court — as well as other possible contenders — to become ‘the most extraordinarily 
powerful court of law the world has ever known.’”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Daniel M. Brinks & Abby Blass, Rethinking Judicial Empowerment: The New 
Foundations of Constitutional Justice, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 321 (2017) (“[T]here is no consensus 
on the concept or the measure of judicial power.”); Tom Ginsburg et al., Judicial Review in New 
Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, 3 NTU L. REV. 143 (2008). 
 5.  See, e.g., David Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, in 
PUBLIC LAW IN EAST ASIA (Albert H.Y. Chen & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2013); Shigenori Matsui, Why is 
the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375 (2011). 
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measure; components; and explanation of judicial power.  The first two of 
these in combination address the question of whether, for example, the 
Supreme Court of India has become more powerful since the 1980s and, if 
so, the third addresses why this is the case.  What accounts for this increase?  
In other words, this first question looks to evidentiary factors and the second 
to explanatory ones. 
The Article begins (in Part II) by canvassing various possible criteria, 
measures or tests of judicial power, suggesting that the consequential nature 
of a constitutional court in terms of affecting the outcomes of important 
constitutional and political disputes is the most plausible one, and ironing 
out a few wrinkles to try and get the most out of it.  Part III argues that the 
consequential nature of a constitutional court is a function of three broad 
categories or types of variables: (1) formal rules and powers; (2) legal and 
judicial practice; and (3) the immediate political and electoral context in 
which it operates.  As we shall see, the second and third categories can and 
do both increase and reduce judicial power relative to the first.  Through a 
process of mutual interaction, each of these three helps to shape and 
constitute the more specific components of a court’s institutional power, 
which include the nature, scope, and content of the constitution it enforces, 
the jurisdictional and remedial powers it has and employs, the ease or 
difficulty of constitutional amendment, and its composition and tenure. 
In Part IV, the Article moves from measuring to explaining the strength 
or weakness of constitutional courts.  Unlike in Parts II and III, here we are 
looking not for evidence of power or strength, but rather for explanations of 
the evidence found; not (to reuse the above example) to see whether the U.S. 
and Japanese courts use their powers in very different ways, but why.  The 
explanatory variables identified and discussed are: (1) deliberate 
constitutional design choices; (2) legal culture; and (3) the more general 
political structure within which a court operates.  In both Parts III and IV, it 
will be argued it is the interaction of the various factors that does most of the 
evidentiary and explanatory work.  Moreover, because these factors are not 
fixed but change over time, so too does the relative power of the courts they 
help to identify and explain.  In Part V, the Article provides case studies of 
the Supreme Courts of India and Japan that illustrate the role and interaction 
of these multidimensional evidentiary and explanatory factors. 
II.  MEASURES OF THE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
When commentators claim that one or another court is among the most 
powerful in the world, they typically rely—implicitly or explicitly—on one 
or more indicia of strength that it will be useful to separate.  The first of these 
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is international influence, as evidenced by, inter alia, the borrowing of its 
constitutional work product by other apex courts, discussion or citation of its 
judgments by courts, policymakers, and scholars, and/or their reproduction 
in comparative constitutional textbooks and other materials.  For example, 
by this measure, a good case can be made for the strength of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, given in particular the adoption of both its 
proportionality analysis and doctrine of the indirect horizontal effect of 
constitutional rights by many national and international courts around the 
world in recent decades.6  By contrast, the influence of the U.S. Supreme 
Court abroad has declined significantly since the end of the Warren Court 
era,7 when Bickel made his well-known claim.8  Yet it is far from clear that, 
overall, the modern U.S. court is any less powerful than its predecessor.  In 
other words, this measure is too externally focused to serve as a reliable or 
accurate sole criterion. 
A second measure of strength is “judicial activism,” in this context 
referring to the number, frequency, or percentage of cases in which 
constitutional courts exercise their powers of judicial review against the 
government of the day, especially where this involves invalidating 
legislation.9  For example, during the 1990s the new Hungarian 
Constitutional Court was estimated to have struck down approximately one-
third of all statutes that it reviewed,10 leading to it being considered a 
particularly powerful court,11 at least before “its wings were clipped”12 by 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban, first at the end of that decade by his 
replacement of its chief justice and more comprehensively after he returned 
to power with a supermajority in 2010.  The French Conseil constitutionnel 
 
 6.  On the spread of proportionality analysis from Germany, see Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, 
Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008).  On 
indirect horizontal effect, see e.g., MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 196 (2008) (“The German 
Constitutional Court’s decision in the case of Erich Lüth [establishing the doctrine of indirect horizontal 
effect] has been enormously influential.”). 
 7.  David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 768 (2012). 
 8.  See BICKEL, supra note 2. 
 9.  On the complexities of defining and comparing “judicial activism,” see Nuno Garoupa, 
Comparing Judicial Activism – Can we Say that the US Supreme Court is more Activist than the German 
Constitutional Court?, 72 REVISTA PORTUGUESA DE FILOSOFIA 1089 (2016). 
 10.  See Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary (Or, why Courts Can be More Democratic 
than Parliaments), in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 25, 44 (Adam Czarnota et al. 
eds., 2005). 
 11.  See Jon Elster, On Majoritarianism and Rights, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 19, 22 (1992) 
(characterizing the Court as “the most powerful constitutional court in the world”). 
 12.  Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Hungarian Constitutional Court, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 81, 87 
(1999). 
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had an even higher rate of finding challenged legislation unconstitutional in 
whole or part even before 2010,13 when its jurisdictional limitations might 
otherwise have made it seem weaker than most other modern constitutional 
courts.14  Using the same metric but on the other side of the ledger, the 
“weakness” or “conservatism” of the Japanese Supreme Court is standardly 
evidenced by citing the statistic that since 1947 it has only found eight 
statutes unconstitutional, in whole or in part.15  Similarly with Scandinavian 
supreme courts.16  By contrast, courts often perceived as among the most 
powerful in the world have far lower invalidation rates than the Hungarian 
court of the 1990s or the French Conseil—on average approximately one 
federal statute every two years by the U.S. Supreme Court, five per year in 
the first 17 years of the South African Court, and nine per year by the German 
Court since its inception in 1951.17  Accordingly, such activism appears to 
be neither a necessary nor a sufficient measure of power. 
A third criterion is a more nuanced and broader-gauged, but less easily 
quantified, conception of the power of a constitutional courts that focuses on 
how consequential an actor it is in terms of affecting the outcomes of 
important constitutional and political issues; that is, its actual impact on 
social and political outputs.18  This criterion takes into account the various 
roles that constitutional courts play and the concrete differences their 
decisions make, as well as their gravitational pull on other political actors 
and processes even without their overt intervention.19  So, for example, by 
 
 13.  See VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 84 
(2009) (reporting that “around half its decisions have found the challenged provisions to be totally or 
partially unconstitutional”); Louis Favoreu, The Constitutional Council and Parliament in France, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 95 (Christine 
Landfried ed., 1988) (“the proportion of nullification compared to the total number of cases decided is 
undoubtedly higher in France than in other countries”). 
 14.  Prior to the constitutional amendment in 2010, the Conseil had no “concrete review” 
jurisdiction from other courts and could only exercise “abstract review” prior to the promulgation of a 
statute. 
 15.  See, e.g., Law, supra note 5, at 1547; Matsui supra note 5, at 1388. See also SHIGENORI 
MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 147 (2011). 
 16.  See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Nordic Counternarrative: Democracy, Human Development, and 
Judicial Review, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449, 450–51 (2011) (citing, inter alia, the fact that the Danish 
Supreme Court has invalidated statutes only once in 160 years as evidence that “the Nordic model of 
judicial review . . . is the true, genuine weak-form judicial review”). 
 17.  Aileen Kavanagh, Situating the Strike-Down 3–4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 18.  See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY, CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL 
ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2013) 
(taking this general approach). See also Brinks & Blass, supra note 4, at 297–98. 
 19.  See, e.g., Alec Stone, Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe, 
in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY (D. Jackson & C.N. Tate eds., 1992) (focusing 
on the interaction between courts and political institutions in establishing policy). 
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this measure the extraordinary role that the Colombian Constitutional Court 
has played in that country’s peace process and agreement is a manifestation 
of its institutional power,20 regardless of how this is viewed elsewhere or 
whether it upholds or invalidates the resulting document. 
Overall, it seems appropriate that in identifying the indicia of power 
among constitutional courts, we should employ more or less the same ones 
that apply to the other political actors in a system; in the first instance it is 
their power relative to these actors that is being assessed, and only then is 
the power of courts being compared inter se.  For when we say that Court A 
is more powerful than Court B, what we mean (or should mean), I think, is 
that Court A is more powerful within its constitutional system than Court B 
is in its own.  It is also unclear why power should be conceptualized 
differently if, or just because, we are focusing on courts rather than, for 
example, executives or legislatures. Accordingly, this general political 
science conception of power or strength seems to be the proper starting point, 
and perhaps also reflects the intuitive or implicit measure underlying certain 
common ascriptions of strength (such as the U.S. Supreme Court) better than 
the other two measures previously considered. 
One aspect of this conception, however, arguably needs to be refined to 
the extent it insists that political power is the ability to impose one’s will on 
other actors and institutions.21  For insofar as political scientists and others 
have persuasively argued that courts have, in some contexts and for various 
reasons, been empowered by the other political branches themselves,22 it 
seems perverse to claim that where politicians are happy, and prefer, to 
delegate constitutional issues to courts, this cannot be said to increase 
judicial power.  For example, it is widely understood that one key factor in 
the rise of modern executives at the expense of legislatures around the world 
has been the delegation of lawmaking authority to the former by the latter  
 
 
 
 
 20.  See MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
LEADING CASES 226–40 (2017). Most recently, the court upheld the constitutional amendments 
incorporating the peace agreement into the constitution and prohibiting any change to the agreement for 
three presidential cycles, or 12 years. 
 21.  This is Robert Dahl’s influential conception. See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 
BEHAV. SCI. 201 (1957). 
 22.  See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 65–66 (2003); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 38–49 (2004); KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xi–xii (2007); infra note 119. 
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for various reasons.23  And yet, we do not thereby conclude that this cannot 
be said to increase the political power of executives. 
 One criterion that is not a test of the overall power or strength or 
weakness of a constitutional court is the distinction between “strong-form” 
and “weak-form” judicial review.24  This distinction refers primarily to a 
narrower and more particular constitutional design choice in 
institutionalizing judicial review—whether or not legislatures are legally 
empowered to respond to specific judicial review decisions within the 
existing constitution (i.e., without amending it)—and is not claimed or 
intended to provide a single metric for the overall or all-things-considered 
strength or weakness of courts.25  These are simply two distinct issues, 
notwithstanding that both make use of the terms “strong” and “weak.”26  As 
I shall explain in the next part, this design choice may be one factor among 
many that can affect the overall power or weakness of a constitutional court; 
but it is not—and was never claimed to be—the only or major criterion. 
 III.  MEASURING HOW CONSEQUENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS ARE 
If we accept that the best or most useful conception of a constitutional 
court’s overall power or strength is not its international influence or the 
percentage of its judgments that find against the government of the day, but 
rather its more diffuse status as a consequential political actor within a 
(domestic or transnational) constitutional order, then the key question 
 
 23.  See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Congress and the Executive Branch: Delegation and Presidential 
Dominance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS (George C. Edwards III, Frances 
E. Lee & Eric Schickler eds., 2011) (highlighting the increase of executive action due to the organizational 
structures of the executive branch, the rise of the administrative state, the power of agenda setting, and 
lack of technical skills by Congress). 
 24.  See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2802 (2003) 
(introducing the terminology of “weak-form” versus “strong-form” judicial review). 
 25.  Id. at 2782–86.  The “strong-form/weak-form” distinction does not even signify the only way 
that judicial review can be said to be strong or weak, much less the overall institutional power of a 
constitutional court more generally.  On the “multidimensional” factors determining the strength or 
weakness of judicial review, see TAMAS GYORFI, AGAINST THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 216–51 
(2016) (identifying the scope and intensity of judicial review, in addition to its finality). 
 26.  A third distinct issue in the literature utilizing the language of strength and weakness is the 
character of particular exercises of judicial review, particularly with respect to remedies. Thus, choosing 
to employ the remedy of a suspended, rather than an immediate, declaration of invalidity is sometimes 
said to be a “weaker” or more “dialogical” exercise of a court’s powers, although this characterization 
has been contested. See Robert Leckey, The Harms of Remedial Discretion, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 584, 
584–86 (2016). Similarly, the original 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Brown I”), declaring the unconstitutionality of racially segregated schools, 
has been contrasted with the “weaker” decision a year later in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 
753, 757 (1955) (“Brown II”), giving states significant remedial discretion by requiring them to 
desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” 
GARDBAUM_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  9:03 AM 
2018] WHAT MAKES FOR MORE OR LESS POWERFUL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS? 9 
becomes: what determines this status?  What are the sources and components 
of judicial power that make some constitutional courts strong or significant 
institutional actors relative to the other branches within their system of 
government, and others weak, with far less impact on constitutionally 
relevant policy outcomes?  The answer, I suggest, is a function of three broad 
variables: (1) formal rules and powers, (2) legal and judicial practice, and (3) 
the immediate political and electoral context in which the court operates.  In 
arguing for the importance, and interaction, of all three, I am self-consciously 
resisting the twin perspectives that formal powers determine everything and 
nothing about inter-branch relations and constitutional politics. 
In a recent article, Daniel Brinks and Abby Blass have proposed that 
judicial power is properly measured by the interaction of three formal 
institutional design choices: (1) the extent of a court’s “ex ante autonomy,” 
or freedom from external control before the judges are seated, which is a 
function of the number of actors involved in the formal process of judicial 
appointment; (2) its “ex post autonomy” or freedom from means of punishing 
or rewarding judges after appointment; and (3) the scope of its authority in 
terms of jurisdiction, accessibility, and remedial powers.27  Thus, courts 
granted greater combined formal autonomy and authority will be more 
powerful than courts with less.  As a way of conceptualizing and measuring 
judicial power, this strikes me as a very helpful contribution, especially in 
terms of breaking down the diffuse idea of a consequential court into its more 
concrete constitutive parts.  But, as the authors readily concede, “actual 
judicial power is not simply a function of institutional design”28 and 
“whether and how courts use their formal power is contingent upon several 
variables”29 beyond the scope of their analysis.  So, by looking to the role of 
legal practice and political context in filling in this more complete picture, 
albeit in a schematic way, I aim to suggest and illustrate the most important 
other variables.  However, seemingly contra Brinks and Blass, these other 
factors do not only play a role in whether, when, and to what extent courts 
choose to exercise their measure of power.  This is because the autonomy 
and authority of constitutional courts themselves are partly constituted by 
legal practice and political context, and are not exclusively a matter of formal 
institutional design.  For example, as we will see, neither the 
impartiality/independence of the judicial appointments process nor the 
 
 27.  Brinks & Blass, supra note 4, at 299. For Brinks & Blass, ex post autonomy is a function of the 
number of veto players in the removal process, the length of judicial tenure, and whether there is 
constitutional protection against court-packing, jurisdiction stripping, and monetary pressures on the 
court.  Id. at 307–11. 
 28.  Id. at 304. 
 29.  Id. 
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jurisdiction, accessibility, and powers of constitutional courts are necessarily 
fixed by initial design choices but can and do vary with context and over 
time without changes in formal authority.  Moreover, autonomy and 
authority are sometimes taken by constitutional courts in the course of their 
practice rather than granted by institutional designers.  Accordingly, the 
following tripartite division does not neatly or simply map onto a distinction 
between the possession and use of a formal legal power.  In other words, 
with autonomy and authority, as with so much else, there is a gap between 
form and substance. 
 A.  Formal Powers 
Among the important questions of legal or formal authority affecting 
the overall institutional role and political power of the courts in any system 
are the following: 
(1) Does the country have a written or codified constitution, or a bill of 
rights with constitutional status, that one or more courts are empowered to 
enforce in a non-minimal way?  As Tocqueville was perhaps the first to state 
explicitly, judicial review of legislation is, in and of itself, a significant 
political power of the courts.30 
(2) What is the scope of such a constitution?  Does it regulate a wide 
range of actors and activities in that society (at the extreme, a so-called “total 
constitution”31) or a relatively narrow range, perhaps limited to creating the 
governing institutions and ground rules of political engagement, and a 
handful of defensive or negative rights against the state?  Is the constitution 
in question a transformative one, thereby tasking all public officials, 
including the judiciary, with bringing about fundamental change in the 
political society?32 
 
 30.  “So an American judge is exactly like the magistrates of other countries. Nevertheless, he is 
invested with immense political power. How does this come about? . . . The reason lies in this one fact: 
the Americans have given their judges the right to base their decisions on the Constitution rather than on 
the laws. In other words, they allow them not to apply laws which they consider unconstitutional.” ALEXIS 
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 100–01 (J.P. Mayer ed., Harper & Row 1969) (1835). As 
Aileen Kavanagh has urged, one should not, as perhaps Tocqueville did, overstate the importance of the 
“strike down” power relative to other remedial powers of constitutional review, including the power to 
modify incompatible statutes through interpretation; but (as she also urges) one should not underestimate 
it either.  See Kavanagh, supra note 17, at 17. 
 31.  Mattias Kumm, Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles 
and the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341 (2006). 
 32.  See Dirk Kotzé, Constitutionalism and Democratic Transitions: Lessons from South Africa, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 81, 83 (Veronica 
Federico & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2006) (“The Constitution therefore clearly visualizes itself as a transitional 
and transformational instrument: one involved in political and social engineering.”); see also Micheala 
Hailbronner, Transformative Constitutionalism: Not Only in the Global South, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 527 
(2017). 
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(3) How specific or general are its provisions; i.e., how much scope for 
judicial interpretation does it contain?  At the extreme, a self-interpreting 
constitution would mostly be self-enforcing.  At the same time, the more 
detail a constitution contains (for example, concerning the legislative process 
and/or constitutional obligations), the greater license it may provide for 
legitimate judicial intervention.33 
(4) Are courts granted strong or weak-form powers of judicial review?34  
Although undoubtedly courts with strong-form powers may be weak 
political actors overall and vice-versa,35 because this is only one factor 
among the many that are relevant, it is probably not purely coincidental that 
the courts most frequently perceived as among the most powerful all have 
strong-form powers; i.e., legislatures in these countries are not legally 
empowered to respond to constitutional court decisions by ordinary majority 
vote. 
(5) What remedial powers do the courts possess?  Whether 
constitutional courts have been empowered to invalidate statutes that are 
incompatible with the constitution, to issue suspended declarations of 
invalidity, advisory opinions, and/or non-legally binding declarations of 
incompatibility, to modify/reinterpret incompatible statutes and to what 
extent, and/or to order damages for, or enjoin, constitutional violations are 
important variables in the nature and type of interbranch relations that exist 
and are possible on constitutional issues.36 
(6) How onerous or flexible are the formal constitutional amendment 
rules?  This is one factor, although to be sure not the only one,37 in 
determining how easy or difficult it is in practice to overrule a constitutional 
 
 33.  For example, I have argued that a recent series of extraordinary interventions by the South 
African Constitutional Court reviewing internal legislative proceedings (as distinct from legislative acts) 
is to be explained in part by the comparatively detailed and extensive textual provisions in the 
Constitution dealing with the legislature’s functions, processes, and especially obligations.  See Stephen 
Gardbaum, Judicial Review of Legislative Procedures in South Africa 11–14 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 34.  See supra text accompanying notes 24–25. 
 35.  See Mark Tushnet & Rosalind Dixon, Weak-Form Review and its Constitutional Relatives: An 
Asian Perspective, in ROSALIND DIXON & TOM GINSBURG, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
ASIA 113–14 (2014); Aileen Kavanagh, What’s So Weak About “Weak-Form Review”? The Case of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1008, 1030–36 (2015); Kavanagh, supra note 17, at 16–
17. 
 36.  See ROBERT LECKEY, BILLS OF RIGHTS IN THE COMMON LAW 30–31 (2015) (emphasizing the 
general importance of focusing on the various remedial powers of constitutional courts). 
 37.  See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? 
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 686, 
699 (2015). 
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court by constitutional amendment;38 the easier it is, ceteris paribus, the less 
powerful a constitutional court is likely to be. 
(7) Are courts empowered to review not only statutes and 
administrative actions for constitutionality, but also the substance of 
constitutional amendments?  Where they are, things are not ceteris paribus, 
and this adds a further layer of complexity, as we shall see in more detail in 
the Indian case study.  The judicial power to declare constitutional 
amendments substantively unconstitutional has been referred to as “super-
strong” judicial review39 and the basis for a “truly supreme” judiciary.”40 
(8) What is the jurisdiction of the constitutional/supreme court, what 
types of claims can it hear, and can the political branches reduce it?  Is the 
power of judicial review centralized in a specialist constitutional court, 
which may have incentives to exercise its only (or major) function more 
robustly than a multi-functional or generalist apex court in a decentralized 
system?41 
(9) In terms of “standing” rules, how accessible is the court?  May 
ordinary citizens petition it?  Do politicians have relatively easy or difficult 
access?  The harder it is to get through its door, the less opportunity a court 
has to exercise its power and jurisdiction. 
(10) How are constitutional judges appointed?  Is their appointment 
controlled by existing members of the judiciary (for example, the 
“collegium” system in India), by an independent commission, by voters via 
election,42 by the executive or legislature alone, or is the approval of both 
branches required?  What is the voting rule for appointment to the court on 
the part of the appointing body: a simple majority of members or a 
supermajority?  Ceteris paribus, a supermajority requirement is likely to 
result in the appointment of different, more consensual, selections.43  How 
many judicial vacancies arise at the same time and how frequently they arise 
are also likely to affect the constitutional politics of selection.44 
 
 38.  See Rosalind Dixon & Adrienne Stone, Constitutional Amendment and Political 
Constitutionalism: A Philosophical and Comparative Reflection, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95, 95–97 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thorburn eds., 2016). 
 39.  See Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine 
of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606, 611 (2015). 
 40.  Richard Albert, How a Court Becomes Supreme: Defending the Constitution from 
Unconstitutional Amendments, 77 MD. L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2017). 
 41.  See Victor Ferreres Comella, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a 
Special Court: Some Thoughts on Judicial Activism, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1730–31 (2004). 
 42.  As currently in Bolivia. 
 43.  See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1702 (2004). 
 44.  Id. 
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(11) What is their tenure?  Are constitutional court judges appointed for 
life, with or without a mandatory retirement age, or for a renewable or 
nonrenewable fixed term?  How long is that term?  Do judges have to worry 
about reappointment or their post-judicial employment prospects? 
(12) Relatedly, where they do have reason to worry, are the judgments 
of the court required to be anonymous and unattributable, or individualized?  
Are concurrences or dissents permitted? 
Apart from a completely sham constitutional system in which formal 
powers bear no or very little relation to political realities, it is hard to imagine 
that if a constitutional system were to answer these twelve questions45 by 
granting the maximalist legal powers to its constitutional court, these would 
not convert into the currency of “actual political power” vis-à-vis the other 
political institutions in that system.  Similarly, a judiciary with few formal 
powers, such as that in China, is highly unlikely to have much political power 
in practice.  In between these poles, more typically, legal powers will be an 
important but often not sufficient factor by which to ascribe or predict 
strength.  Two courts might have broadly similar formal powers across many 
or all of these factors, as for example the U.S. and Japanese supreme courts, 
and yet be very different in terms of actual or de facto judicial power.  At the 
very least, the differences in judicial power may be far greater than, and not 
closely correspond with, any differences in formal powers.  Similarly, a 
single constitutional court might become significantly more or less powerful 
over time or in a given time period without changes in its formal powers, as 
the examples of the U.S. and Indian supreme courts suggest. 
 B.  Legal and Judicial Practice 
 The second broad category of factors that must be taken into account 
as a source and component of the power of a constitutional court is legal and 
judicial practice.  Obviously whether, how, and when the different 
substantive and remedial legal powers of the judiciary canvassed in the 
previous section (as well as any responsive powers of the political branches) 
are actually used will be highly relevant to measuring the actual overall 
strength or weakness of courts in the respective jurisdictions.  A court that 
never uses its formal powers or invariably practices deference towards the 
decisions it is reviewing cannot be considered a strong or powerful court and 
is likely to be less so than a court that more robustly employs the lesser or 
 
 45.  Of these twelve questions, the first part of number ten corresponds with Brinks and Blass’ factor 
of ex ante autonomy, number eleven with ex post autonomy, and (I believe) numbers five, eight and nine 
with their third factor of “authority.” See Brinks & Blass, supra note 27 and accompanying text. In 
addition, numbers one, two, and six overlap in part with Gyorfi’s factor of the “scope of judicial review” 
and number four with its “finality.” See GYORFI, supra note 25. 
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fewer formal powers at its disposal.  Formal authority in the abstract or on 
paper is presumably not what we are interested in measuring.  Similarly, a 
court whose decisions/orders are regularly disobeyed, ignored, subjected to 
legislative override—where this exists46—or also perhaps reversed by 
constitutional amendment, is, ceteris paribus, less likely to be considered 
strong or powerful than one that is not. 
In addition to its general importance in this way, there are a number of 
more specific areas in which actual practice beyond the formal rules is partly 
constitutive of judicial power itself.  One of these is judicial appointments.  
It may be recalled that for Brinks and Blass, a court’s “ex ante autonomy” is 
a function of the number of actors involved in the formal process of judicial 
appointments.47  But whatever the number involved or the particular process 
chosen by the drafters and built into the textual provisions, a practice and 
norm of judicial appointments made (a) without any reference to political 
affiliation at all (as mostly, for example, in Canada, India, and the UK), 
versus (b) a practice of political appointments but of people with independent 
professional stature and experience (as mostly, for example, in the U.S. and 
Germany) or (c) the appointment of party loyalists with personal obligations 
to the appointer, will likely affect the ex ante autonomy of the court.48  All 
three possibilities can and do exist even where a single actor or institution 
has the formal power of appointment.49 
Similarly, the practices and norms surrounding the age (above the 
textually-specified minimum) at which constitutional court judges are 
appointed, in combination with the formal tenure provision, may affect a 
court’s ex ante autonomy in only slightly more subtle ways.  Thus the 
growing practice of appointing relatively younger Supreme Court justices 
(as well as more partisan ones) in the United States, when combined with the 
life tenure guaranteed by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, not only 
potentially increases the appointing president’s “dead hand control” into the 
future, but creates greater judicial autonomy vis-à-vis future presidents and 
gives individual justices decades in which to construct their “legacies” and 
 
 46.  As typically under weak-form judicial review. See Tushnet, supra notes 24–25 and 
accompanying text. 
 47.  See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 48.  Very occasionally textual provisions prohibit the judicial appointment of members of a political 
party. One example is South Africa. See infra text accompanying note 96. 
 49.  Thus, in Canada and the UK, the traditional appointments process until recently was by the 
executive alone: the prime minister made appointments on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Justice/Lord Chancellor, who is a member of the cabinet. In Germany, half of the Constitutional Court is 
appointed by the lower house of the legislature (the Bundestag) alone, and half by the upper house (the 
Bundesrat) alone. In Japan, where the Supreme Court consists mostly of party loyalists, the prime minister 
appoints its members, conventionally after receiving a recommendation from the Chief Justice.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 163–164. 
GARDBAUM_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  9:03 AM 
2018] WHAT MAKES FOR MORE OR LESS POWERFUL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS? 15 
play “the long game.”  By contrast, a practice of appointing older judges 
relatively close to a mandatory retirement age detracts from judicial 
autonomy and the stability and coherence of a court. 
One feature of judicial practice that potentially affects the ex post 
autonomy of constitutional courts is the norms surrounding the issuing of 
individualized or attributable opinions by judges who lack life tenure.  The 
civil law tradition of anonymous and unattributable judgments, which 
functions as a shield to protect the independence of constitutional court 
judges who are anticipating reappointment or post-judicial employment, has 
been reformed (typically through legislation) to permit concurrences and 
dissents in many places in recent years.50  Even where this has happened, the 
development of a judicial norm of concurring or dissenting only in 
exceptional circumstances, as in Germany, permits courts to maintain a veil 
of ignorance between its members and government re-appointers or potential 
employers in most cases. 
In terms of the scope of a constitutional court’s authority, practice plays 
a large role in determining its full extent.  Starting with jurisdiction, perhaps 
the most famous instance in all of constitutional law is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s implication of its own power of judicial review in Marbury v. 
Madison.51  On the other hand, the same court’s practice of giving a fairly 
narrow reading of the standing rules for federal courts—a reading, for 
example, that limits the ability of federal political actors to sue for alleged 
“separation of powers” violations by other branches, and asserts a “political 
question” limitation on its jurisdiction—reduces the scope of its authority in 
ways not clearly given or mandated by the text.  Two other prominent 
examples come from the Colombian Constitutional Court.  First, it took a 
broad view of its jurisdiction, and hence authority, in dealing with a series of 
cases in which it attempted to resolve the mortgage and internal displaced 
person crises in the country by holding “legislative-style” informational and 
policy hearings, issuing a series of structural orders, and maintaining control 
to monitor compliance.52  Second, in developing its “substitution of the 
constitution” doctrine, the Court declared it has the power to invalidate 
constitutional amendments that seek to alter fundamental principles of the 
existing text, which amount to replacements rather than amendments, absent 
 
 50.  See, e.g., Katalin Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts, 14 GER. L.J. 1345, 
1345 (2013). 
 51.  See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 52.  See David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 
51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 358–62 (2010). In the context of displaced persons, the Court developed the 
“unconstitutional state of affairs” doctrine to support and justify its broad evidentiary and remedial 
measures. 
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the calling of a constituent assembly.53  Similarly to the Colombian Court, 
the German Constitutional Court essentially gave itself jurisdiction over 
claims to minimum social welfare benefits, despite no clear granting of such 
power or (in the German case) such constitutional rights in the text.54  The 
accessibility of constitutional courts is also affected by such deeply practical 
issues as geographic location, cost, formalities, and the need for a lawyer.  
The sua sponte decision of the Indian Supreme Court to accept a so-called 
“epistolary jurisdiction,” by which it may take a case based on a letter written 
to one of its judges, has been an important symbol of its accessibility role 
and public identity.55 
The remedial powers of constitutional courts, especially more 
innovative ones, have frequently been the product of judicial practice rather 
than formal constitutional design.  For example, the Canadian Supreme 
Court began using the suspended declaration of invalidity, by which 
legislatures are given a deadline for amending or repealing an 
unconstitutional statute themselves, in the early 1990s.56  Although it is 
contested whether this is more or less respectful of legislative privileges,57 
and thus more or less appropriate, than the text-based immediate declaration 
of invalidity, it is not contested that this remedial power was self-granted.  
Similarly, in adjudicating and applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, the New Zealand Court of Appeals (at the time the highest court in 
New Zealand) created a public law damages remedy for violations by the 
executive that was not contained in the text.58  Most recently, the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand has agreed to hear a case on appeal in which the lower 
court implied a power to issue a declaration of inconsistency between a 
statute and the Bill of Rights Act, despite the absence of such a formal power 
in the text.59  On the other hand, it has taken a narrower approach to the scope 
of its power to interpret statutes consistently with the bill of rights than the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court, a power that is in effect remedial, despite 
very similar textual provisions. Thus, the UK Court has taken a more 
 
 53.  See Decisions C-140 of 2005 and C-1041 of 2010 in ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 20, at 
342–60. 
 54.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 9, 2010 1 BvL 
1/09 (Ger.) (leading to Hartz IV and V benefit reform). The textual provisions of the Basic Law on which 
the FCC has relied are the inviolability of human dignity in Article 1 and the description of the federal 
republic as a “democratic and social federal state” in Article 20. 
 55.  See, e.g., Jeremy Cooper, Poverty and Constitutional Justice: The Indian Experience, 44 
MERCER L. REV. 611, 624 (1993). 
 56.  The first such case was Schachter v. Canada [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679. 
 57.  See Leckey, supra note 26. 
  58.   Simpson v. Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
 59.  Attorney-General v. Taylor [2017] NZCA 215 at [3]. 
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“adventurous” approach that amounts to judicial modification of statutes,60 
an approach the New Zealand Court has rejected and described as 
“unreasonable.”61  The Colombian Constitutional Court’s development of 
the “state of unconstitutional affairs” doctrine has been the basis for some of 
its broadest remedial orders.62 
Finally, although to be sure not unconnected to several other listed 
factors, the quality of a constitutional court’s judicial reasoning tends to add 
or detract from its authority, both generally and in specific cases.  A court 
that issues weak, badly reasoned, or transparently instrumental judgments is 
less likely to be, and be seen as, a consequential institutional actor than one 
that does the opposite.  Recent decisions of the Venezuelan Supreme Court 
are an extreme example of this point.63  By contrast, the generally well-
reasoned and comprehensive judgments of the Colombian Court have added 
to its authority and prestige.64  At the level of specific, rather than general, 
authority, the widely-held view that the U.S. Supreme Court’s judicial 
reasoning in support of a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade65 
was fairly weak affected the way the decision was received and added to its 
vulnerability.66  By contrast, the generally better and more fully reasoned 
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey67 appears to have somewhat greater 
authority and has perhaps enabled the “essential holding of Roe” to withstand 
a multi-decade political crusade to overturn it.  Similarly, whether Griswold 
v. Connecticut,68 Roe’s foundation and precursor, would have survived on 
 
 60.  See AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 309 
(2009). 
 61.  R v. Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1. 
 62.  See CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 20, at 178–90. 
 63.  See, e.g., Pedro Rosas, How Venezuela’s Supreme Court Triggered One of the Biggest Political 
Crises in the Country’s History, VOX (May 1, 2017), at https://www.vox.com/world/ 
2017/5/1/15408828/venezuela-protests-maduro-parliament-supreme-court-crisis. 
 64.  See, e.g., Inter.-Am. Comm’n H.R., Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia 
para. 17, at 36–37, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1 (February 26, 1999)  (stating that, “The Commission 
has observed that the Constitutional Court, which only began to function in 1992, has attained a high 
level of respectability and prestige through its independent and objective treatment of issues of great 
importance for the exercise of human rights and the rule of law in Colombia.  The Court has issued well-
reasoned decisions on issues ranging from the constitutionality of amnesties for political crimes, 
legislation relating to the rights of women in the work force, declared states of emergency, etc.”). 
 65.  See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 66.  See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 933–36 (1973); Daniel A. Farber, Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test?, 70 
MO. L. REV. 1231, 1231–33 (2005). 
 67.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 68.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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the highly questionable authority of the majority opinion alone,69 without the 
support of the concurrences (and especially that of Justice Harlan), is 
anyone’s guess. 
C.  Specific or Immediate Political and Electoral Context 
The autonomy and authority of constitutional courts is, however, not 
only a function of formal powers and (sometimes) evolving legal/judicial 
practice but also of the more rapidly changing contingencies of political 
context.  As a result, where a given constitutional court stands on the metric 
of power is not always fixed, or even relatively stable, but can fluctuate 
significantly with shifts in the political winds.  Specifically with respect to 
the other constitutive components of judicial power, different alignments of 
political and electoral forces can have a marked impact. 
For example, regarding the ex ante autonomy of constitutional courts 
vis-à-vis the other institutions of a polity, the consequences of a two-thirds 
legislative voting rule for judicial appointments will vary depending on the 
results of the previous election and the voting system used.  So, for example, 
whereas in the political context of Germany’s complex proportional 
representation voting system that essentially ensures (a) no single party will 
have a majority of legislators and (b) a coalition government, the result of a 
two-thirds supermajority requirement for appointment to the constitutional 
court is to promote consensus candidates who can attract cross-party 
support.70  Combined with the rolling twelve-year term and resulting 
multiple vacancies at a time, which ensures a division of spoils among the 
major parties, the German court is typically staffed with centrist judges from 
more than one party.71  By contrast, the same two-thirds judicial appointment 
rule in Hungary, combined with a voting system that has permitted Viktor 
Orban’s Fidesz party to win two-thirds of the seats in the unicameral 
legislature with 52%, 45%, and 49% of the vote respectively in 2010, 2014, 
and 2018 has enabled Fidesz to pack the constitutional court with party 
loyalists and largely destroy its autonomy.72 
 
 69.  See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 722 (2010) 
(“‘Penumbras and emanations’ has become an in-joke around the law schools as shorthand for activist 
constitutional adjudication, an invitation for the Court ‘to protect those activities that enough Justices to 
form a majority think ought to be protected and not activities with which they have little sympathy.’”) 
(quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 99 
(1991)). 
 70.  See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 43, at 1681, 1702. 
 71.  Id. at 2004. 
 72.  See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Attacks on the Rule of Law and Why They Matter for 
Business, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/6c538e70-168f-3d1e-ba92-
8a80790a6247. 
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In terms of ex post autonomy, a non-life tenured constitutional court 
judge who can reasonably expect a change of government through electoral 
or other means by the time she/he may be seeking either re-appointment or 
post-judicial public employment, might have somewhat different incentives 
than one who cannot.  To the extent that the prospect or reality of being 
overruled by constitutional amendment impacts the power of a court 
(especially absent the power to invalidate it), the likelihood of such 
amendment is similarly a function not only of the formal amendment rule, 
but also of the immediate, practical political context of whether the necessary 
votes are there.  For example, while Fidesz in Hungary was able not only to 
amend but to replace the entire constitution under the pre-existing two-thirds 
amendment rule shortly after winning a supermajority of legislative seats in 
2010, proposed constitutional amendments in the United States almost never 
get past the same two-thirds rule needed to send them to the states for 
ratification.73  This is due not simply to the extreme rarity of such a 
supermajority for one party but also to the hyperpolarized nature of modern 
party politics in the United States that enhances all the veto points in the 
system.74  By contrast, less polarized political systems are more often able to 
reach the cross-party consensus necessary for constitutional amendments 
absent a single party/bloc legislative supermajority. 
Another source of judicial power that can broadly be categorized as part 
of the immediate political context in which constitutional courts operate are 
public opinion polls.  Thus, to the extent that in certain countries, 
constitutional courts regularly receive higher approval ratings from the 
public than the other political institutions and actors, this provides a 
supplementary source of both autonomy and authority, as well as legitimacy 
that may embolden them to act in ways they might otherwise not do.  Indeed, 
there is an increasing tendency on the part of such courts to actually refer to 
their higher public support as a basis for the legitimacy of their actions and 
role.75 
IV.  FROM MEASURING TO EXPLAINING JUDICIAL POWER 
The previous Part attempted to identify the factors that combine to 
determine how consequential and powerful a given constitutional court is.  
 
 73.  Of course, in the United States, both houses of Congress must pass the proposed amendment 
by a two-thirds vote. 
 74.  See generally, Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of 
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011). 
 75.  For the role that modern public opinion polls have had in changing the way that courts justify 
their power and use of it, see Or Bassok, The Supreme Court at the Bar of Public Opinion Polls, 23 
CONSTELLATIONS 573 (2016). 
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As we saw, legal and judicial practices can and do expand or reduce a court’s 
power relative to its formal autonomy and authority, as is also true of the 
concrete and immediate electoral/political context in which it operates.  All 
three factors must be taken into account in order to properly and accurately 
measure the power of a constitutional court, although they are neither fixed 
over time nor hermetically sealed from each other.  To the contrary, through 
a process of mutual interaction, each of the three helps to shape and 
constitute the more specific components of a court’s institutional power, 
which include the jurisdictional and remedial powers it has and employs, the 
ease or difficulty of constitutional amendment, and its composition and 
tenure. 
Armed with this minimally refined way of measuring the power of 
constitutional courts, we can apply it to postulate that Court A is more 
powerful than Court B, even in situations where Court A and Court B appear 
to have similar formal powers.  What we cannot yet do, at least satisfactorily, 
is explain why Court A is more powerful than Court B; not in the sense of 
re-stating the measure, but of accounting for it.  Why is it able to expand its 
power through judicial practice?  Or, why does Court C rarely use its formal 
powers, or why has Court D grown more (or less) powerful over time?  What 
beyond the factors that measure and determine judicial power helps to 
explain individual measurements?  This is the burden to be taken up in this 
part.  The three broad explanatory factors suggested are (1) deliberate 
constitutional design choices; (2) legal culture; and (3) general political and 
social context, understood in a more systematic or structural and less 
immediate, numerical, or electoral sense than in the previous part. 
A.  Deliberate Constitutional Design Choices 
As a general starting point, the grant of formal legal powers will 
ordinarily reflect and express the deliberate design choices of constitutional 
drafters as to how powerful a court they wish to create.76  For example, in 
deciding to give the new Federal Constitutional Court extensive formal 
jurisdiction and powers, including banning political parties as well as 
multiple heads of constitutional review, the members of the Parliamentary 
Council drafting the 1949 German Basic Law were deliberately creating a 
more powerful judicial “guardian of the constitution” and the rule of law than 
 
 76.  See, e.g., Brinks & Blass, supra note 4, at 299.  It should be noted that these include not only 
the substantive choices listed in Part III.A above but also the “meta” ones concerning, for example, how 
much room to leave for judicial interpretation and the scope of the constitution. 
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under the Weimar Constitution.77  The “third wave” of democratization since 
1989 has generally been characterized by the intentional creation on the part 
of constituent assemblies and drafters of either brand new or more powerful 
constitutional courts than before,78 especially in Asia and Latin America.  For 
example, the Colombian Constitutional Court, created by the constituent 
assembly as a key part of the 1991 Constitution, was designed to be a 
consequential actor in the new constitutional order that could, among other 
things, serve as both a protector of rights and a counterweight to the recent 
history of powerful executives.79  Not only was it given the old constitutional 
powers of the existing Supreme Court, which had exercised them in a mostly 
formalistic and deferential manner, but a series of important new ones.  
These included the key tutela jurisdiction, permitting ordinary citizens to 
petition the courts for violations of their fundamental rights for the first 
time.80 
By contrast, the drafters of the French Conseil constitutionnel intended 
to create a less powerful, narrowly focused institution, the major task of 
which was not to serve as the general reviewer of legislation—including for 
rights violations—it subsequently became, but rather to keep the legislature 
from encroaching on the Fifth Republic’s new executive lawmaking 
powers.81  This was reflected in the narrow formal jurisdiction given to the 
Conseil. Originally only the Presidents of the Republic, the National 
Assembly, and the Senate could petition it, and only before the legislation 
was promulgated.  Similarly, drafters of the new bills of rights in New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom deliberately sought to limit the growth of 
judicial power under them in order to preserve the fundamental 
constitutional principle of “parliamentary sovereignty” in these countries.82  
So although both bills of rights granted new and enhanced judicial powers 
for the protection of rights, they institutionalized what has been referred to 
as “weak-form judicial review” as distinct from the more standard “strong-
form.”83  Whether this initial attempt to design less powerful constitutional 
 
 77.  See JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIAN: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT xxvi (2015) (referring to the Basic Law’s “staggering conferral of judicial 
authority”). 
 78.  See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES 191 (2015). 
 79.  See CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 20, at 10. 
 80.  See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA Jul. 4, 1991, art. 86. 
 81.  See Alec Stone Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe, 5 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 69, 80 (2007).  Unusually in a unitary state, Article 34 of the constitution creates an enumerated 
list of legislative lawmaking powers, with the remainder held by the executive. 
 82.  See STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 7–8 (2013). 
 83.  See Tushnet, supra note 24, at 2785–86. 
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courts by limiting their formal powers has been overtaken by the other 
factors of legal practice and political context and, if so, why this has 
happened is the subject of scholarly disagreement.84  
As some of these examples indicate, the deliberate design choices of 
constitutional framers are usually an important, but often not a sufficient, 
explanatory factor.  They sometimes cannot explain, for example, why 
certain courts are able to enhance their powers beyond those originally 
bestowed, why others rarely use those formally granted, or why the power 
of some courts increases over time without changes in the framers’ text. 
 B.  Legal Culture 
Legal culture can help to fill the explanatory gap.  Three general 
variables that may enhance or detract from the ability of courts to increase 
their own power are (1) the status of judges, (2) their historical degree of 
independence, and (3) cultural adherence to rule of law norms within a 
system, although the three are frequently linked.  Thus, where all three are 
high, as for example generally within the common law tradition, then ceteris 
paribus the actual and potential future decisions of judges granted the power 
of constitutional review are more likely to be treated seriously and with 
respect—as consequential—by other political actors in the constitutional 
order, because the political costs of failing to do so are likely to be higher 
than in a system where some or all are not the case.  It is in significant part 
for this reason that, with the notable exceptions of the United States, Ireland, 
and India, until recently most other common law countries expressly denied 
the power of judicial review of legislation to their high status, independent 
judges, in favor of the central constitutional principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty.85  This principle imposed a fairly clear limit on the accretion of 
political and public law-making power in the courts that was considered a 
requirement of representative democracy.  Where the status and relative 
independence of ordinary judges is lower, as mostly in the civil law 
tradition,86 the creation of new and specialized constitutional courts with 
different personnel and appointments processes was often deemed necessary 
 
 84.  See Aileen Kavanagh, What’s So Weak About “Weak-Form Review”? The Case of the UK 
Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 35; see also Stephen Gardbaum, What’s So Weak About “Weak-
Form Review”: A Reply to Aileen Kavanagh, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1040 (2015). 
 85.  This reason also perhaps helps to explain why “weak-form judicial review” might be somewhat 
less weak in practice in such jurisdictions than in others. 
 86.  Because there are typically far more judges than in common law countries and because the 
judiciary is an entry-level, civil service career in which promotion depends significantly on peer review 
by more senior judges. 
GARDBAUM_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  9:03 AM 
2018] WHAT MAKES FOR MORE OR LESS POWERFUL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS? 23 
to bolster the effectiveness and power of the judicial review function.87  By 
contrast, where judicial review remains “decentralized” and exercised by an 
ordinary, lower status career judiciary in the broadly civil law tradition, one 
might expect such courts to be relatively weak, as in Scandinavia. 
Relatedly, as Theunis Roux has argued in the context of democratic 
transitions, the nature of a legal culture as strongly or weakly 
institutionalized, or relatively formalistic versus substantive in what is 
expected of judicial decisionmaking, can significantly affect the agency and 
power of constitutional courts.88  Thus, where the legitimacy of a court’s 
decision is taken to require a relatively legalistic mode of reasoning that 
respects the law/politics distinction, this acts as a constraint compared to a 
legal culture more skeptical of the distinction in which courts are freer to 
take substantive and normative considerations into account.89  Indeed, 
cultural adherence to legalism is a second way (in addition, or as an 
alternative, to the historical resistance to judicial review) in which many 
common law countries have attempted to limit the role of courts in their 
constitutional orders.  On the other hand, where a legal culture is strongly 
institutionalized and/or relatively formalistic but combines this with a high 
regard for judicial status and independence, this can serve to insulate 
constitutional courts from political attack.90 
A more specific instance of the role of general legal culture in helping 
to explain the degree or extent of judicial power is the set of beliefs 
surrounding a country’s constitution and its impact on the likelihood of 
constitutional amendment.  As we have seen, the all-things-considered ease 
or difficulty of constitutional amendment is an important ingredient of 
judicial power: the easier it is in practice to amend a constitution to 
effectively overrule a constitutional court, the less consequential its rulings 
are likely to be.  But over and above both the formal rules and the immediate 
political context that helps to determine whether the formal standard can be 
met, norms and cultures surrounding the resort to constitutional amendment 
may range from the inviolable and “sacred” nature of the existing text to the 
disposable/pragmatic.  Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court (most 
likely) lacks the power to review the substantive constitutionality of 
amendments, the near-sacred character in which the Constitution is held 
 
 87.  See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 49–51 
(1989). 
 88.  See THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1995-2005 72–111 (2013); Theunis Roux, The South African Constitutional 
Court’s Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, 5 CONST. CT, REV. 33, 54–61 (2015) (hereinafter Democratic 
Rights Jurisprudence). 
 89.  Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, supra note 88, at 46–47. 
 90.  Id. 
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further adds to the difficulty, and helps to explain the infrequency, of formal 
constitutional amendment such that in practice this does not significantly 
affect its overall power.  Moreover, as the widely perceived primary or 
distinctive “guardian” of the near-sacred Constitution, the Supreme Court 
gains added cultural prestige and legitimacy relative to the other institutions 
of government.  By contrast, the relative frequency of successful amendment 
suggests there is no significant cultural barrier to changing (as distinct from 
replacing) the German Basic Law, including to effectively overrule the 
Constitutional Court.  Accordingly, even though the Court is equally viewed 
as the guardian of the Basic Law and appears to enjoy a high level of public 
support for its work, it lacks this additional source of cultural capital. 
 C.  General Political Context 
The third broad category of factors that helps to explain relative strength 
or weakness is the general political context in which a constitutional court 
operates.91  The breadth of this category ranges all the way from basic 
structural or macro-political variables, such as the general democratic or 
authoritarian nature of the regime, to increasingly more detailed, specific or 
micro-political variations.  Only short-term alignments of political forces are 
excluded here, because they are considered in Part II.C above, as interacting 
with formal rules and powers in the constitution of judicial autonomy and 
authority.  Starting at the more macro-level, the political space available for 
more independent, robust, and consequential constitutional courts is in 
significant part a function of the general political regime in which it 
operates.92  Some very interesting and cutting edge comparative 
constitutional scholarship has recently focused on both non-liberal versions 
of constitutionalism and the strategic political reasons that even fully 
authoritarian regimes may have to empower or permit a certain degree of 
autonomy and/or authority among one or more of their courts.93  This 
scholarship demonstrates the necessity of the qualification “in significant 
part” above, as with such regimes too, the particular context matters. 
 
 91.  See KAPISZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 18, at 22 (discussing “major domestic political regime 
features” as one of the relatively enduring structural factors that influence the role constitutional courts 
play). 
 92.  For an insightful demonstration of this point, as it applies in Asia, see PO JEN YAP, COURTS 
AND DEMOCRACIES IN ASIA (2017). 
 93.  See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG & ALBERTO SIMPSER EDS., CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES (2014) (exploring mechanisms by which authoritarian regimes utilize constitutions to 
consolidate their power and establish norms, especially during moments of internal conflict); Li-Ann 
Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajo eds., 2012) (creating a typology of 
constitutionalism in different authoritarian regimes); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2015) (examining characteristics of authoritarian constitutionalism in Singapore). 
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With this important caveat in mind, let me suggest that for current 
purposes there are five general regime types which help to explain the 
political space available for, and hence the overall strength or weakness of, 
constitutional or supreme courts operating within them.94  The first two are 
variations of liberal democracy: (1) competitive party liberal democracies 
and (2) dominant party liberal democracies, such as Japan, pre-2000 Mexico, 
and South Africa.  The relevant difference between them, due to the latter’s 
absence of rotation in office, is the respective degree of concentration or 
dispersal of political power other than in the very short-term (i.e., as the 
result of a single, given election), and the opportunities such concentration 
provides for influencing, inter alia, the composition of the courts and/or the 
reception that court decisions might receive from political elites.  Thus, in 
Japan, the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) combined with 
the legal power of the prime minister to appoint judges to the Supreme Court, 
has resulted in a court packed mostly with its party loyalists.95  In South 
Africa, where party or government members are prohibited from serving on 
the constitutional court and the constitution establishes an independent 
Judicial Service Commission to screen candidates for final presidential 
selection,96 the dominant status of the African National Congress (ANC) 
means that its actions (or omissions) are inevitably and uniformly the object 
of judicial review.  This, in turn, means that the Court cannot help but be 
conscious of the reception of, and potential backlash against, its decisions, 
which tend to have no natural, major party support or defenders,97 unlike in 
competitive party democracies.  While this has not prevented the Court from 
exercising greater independence than the Japanese or pre-2000 Mexican 
supreme courts, especially more recently as the ANC’s dominance has been 
in decline, it is nonetheless “constrained” and must tread carefully.98  Within 
dominant party democracies, whether a constitutional court is effectively the 
only independent institution or exists alongside others, as well as a robust 
 
 94.  General regime type usually helps to set the outer parameters of judicial power, but it does not 
always explain where within the parameters it falls. So, there may be significant variations in the strength 
and weakness of constitutional courts within each category, e.g., among competitive party liberal 
democracies. 
 95.  See Tushnet & Dixon, supra note 35, at 113–14. Again, such packing is not simply the result 
of judicial appointment by a single actor, but of its combination with a dominant political party and a 
norm/practice of appointing party loyalists. Absent both of the latter factors, there would be greater 
judicial pluralism on the court.  See supra text accompanying notes 48–49. 
 96.  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, § 174. 
 97.  Although this may be changing with the electoral decline of the ANC and the rise of the 
opposition Democratic Alliance. 
 98.  See Roux, Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, supra note 88, at 70−72 (explaining how the 
ANC’s consolidation of power affected democratic rights jurisprudence of the Court). 
GARDBAUM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  9:03 AM 
26 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 29:1 
media and civil society, also impacts its room for maneuver and ability to 
protect both itself and the constitutional order against democratic erosion.99 
By contrast, (3) “illiberal democracies,” such as contemporary 
Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and (until the last year or so) Venezuela, are 
characterized by a competitive party system and reasonably free and fair 
elections, but also a reduction or erosion of democracy to essentially majority 
rule.  This is accomplished by the concentration of power in the governing 
(typically, populist/nationalist) party, and usually its leader, not as a natural 
political consequence of electoral dominance over time (as with dominant 
party liberal democracies) but of affirmative steps following electoral victory 
to maximize on and entrench its position, and curb the independence of any 
institution it does not control.100  This typically includes the constitutional 
court, as all four examples illustrate; although once it controls the judiciary, 
the target might become the legislature with the court acting as the 
government’s agent, as recently occurred in Venezuela.101  Such affirmative 
and deliberate steps go well beyond influencing the composition of the court 
over time through the pre-existing rules of appointment, instead changing 
these rules in its favor, increasing or reducing the size of the court, reducing 
its powers and jurisdiction, firing “opposition” members, and even physical 
threats.102 
Arguably distinct are (4) authoritarian constitutionalist regimes, such as 
Singapore, which also have reasonably free and fair elections and are not 
liberal democracies, but tend to have a truly—i.e., long established—
dominant political party that affords some degree of independence to their 
courts and certain rights to all citizens.103  While this degree of independence 
 
 99.  See Stu Woolman, A Politics of Accountability: How South Africa’s Judicial Recognition of the 
Binding Legal Effect of the Public Protector’s Recommendations Had a Catalysing Effect that Brought 
Down a President, 8 CONST. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript on file with author) (showing how 
holding former President Zuma accountable for his corruption was a team effort between the 
Constitutional Court, the independent Public Prosecutor, opposition political parties, the media, and civil 
society groups). 
 100.  For a recent case study, see Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case 
Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding 10–14 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 18/01, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491. Where these 
steps include amending or replacing a constitution for such ends, it has been termed “abusive 
constitutionalism.” David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191 (2013). 
 101.  The constitutional court initially took over the legislature’s functions until essentially ordered 
by the president to change its mind, in the face of massive international and domestic denunciation. 
 102.  As, for example, in Hungary since 2010 and Poland since 2015. See Scheppele, supra note 72 
(Hungary); Sadurski, supra note 100, at 41–42 (Poland). 
 103.  See Tushnet, supra note 93, at 413–15. Either or both “illiberal democracy” and “authoritarian 
constitutionalism” may overlap with a new, post-Cold War intermediate regime type between democracy 
and full authoritarianism that has been termed “competitive authoritarianism.” See STEVEN LEVITSKY & 
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is likely to be fairly stable and not under severe, short-term attack, it is 
typically more circumscribed in terms of both composition and concern 
about reception of its decisions by political elites than in either type of liberal 
democracy, especially on constitutional issues.104 
Finally, (5) fully authoritarian regimes come in several forms, including 
one party states like China, multiparty presidential republics like El-Sisi’s 
Egypt, or absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia.  Clearly, boundary 
problems exist (has Venezuela moved all the way from competitive party 
liberal democracy to fully authoritarian regime in two decades?) as do the 
distinct issues raised by “fragile” or “weak” democracies, but the role, space, 
and independence—and therefore the power—of constitutional courts is 
significantly explicable by this primary filter of political regime type, even 
among courts sharing the same formal powers.  Other things being equal, the 
greatest space exists where political power is least concentrated and most 
contested.  As we saw above, to the significant extent that voting systems 
affect this—in Hungary, the mixed majoritarian system gave Orban the 
crucial supermajority of seats without a supermajority of votes, whereas in 
South Africa, the constitutionally-required PR system has mostly prevented 
the ANC from obtaining the two-thirds of seats needed to amend the 
constitution by itself—they are also an important variable shaping and 
explaining judicial power.105 
Of course, since general regime type tends to set the outer parameters 
of judicial power, other structural factors help to explain the fact that not all 
competitive party liberal democracies have constitutional courts of equal 
consequence.Apart from the long-understood fact that there is a close 
historical and functional connection between judicial review and federalism 
in terms of umpiring institutional disputes concerning allocation of powers 
between the two levels of government,106 federalism may also increase “the 
demand” for judicial intervention on rights issues and thereby create greater 
opportunities for courts.  The 2015 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Obergefell v. Hodges107 might be seen as the Court imposing its will on the 
nation, but it can also be viewed as imposing the nation’s will on recalcitrant 
 
LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 3–5 
(2010). 
 104.  See YAP, supra note 92, at 3 (describing courts’ challenges to government in dominant-party 
democracies as compared to competitive party systems). 
 105.  See Stephen Gardbaum, Political Parties, Voting Systems, and the Separation of Powers, 65 
AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 242 (2017). 
 106.  See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 327 
(Henry Regnery Company 1962) (1861). 
 107.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
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states, acknowledging the social change that had recently taken place.108  
Moreover, the role of partisan federalism109 in creating a forum in which 
opposition party state officials can seek judicial review of federal executive 
actions during periods of unified party government at the national level has 
been highlighted in the first year of the Trump administration.  Here, the 
short-term alignment of political forces affects the role and opportunities for 
consequential decision-making by courts in ways that might not otherwise 
occur under more divided national government.110 
While there appears to be no general relationship between the overall 
strength or weakness of constitutional courts and form of government 
(presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential), in that, for example, 
perennial candidates for both most and least powerful courts come from 
countries with parliamentary systems, there may be more particular ones.  
Thus, “separation of powers” issues between the independent legislative and 
executive branches within a presidential system may create more “business” 
for a constitutional court as an impartial umpire along similar functional lines 
as with federalism, especially during times of divided government.111  On the 
other hand, one significant structural factor in—and explanation of—the 
recent growth of judicial review in mature, Westminster-style parliamentary 
democracies has been the perceived over-concentration of power in the 
executive, given its typical control of the legislature through the modern 
system of party discipline.112 
Another important structural political factor affecting and explaining 
the power of courts is how functional or dysfunctional the other branches of 
government are.  Two well-known examples of constitutional courts that 
increased their power by stepping in to plug the gap in governance caused 
by weaknesses in their political systems are the Supreme Court of India (SCI) 
 
 108.  See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Support for Same-Sex Marriage Grows, Even Among Groups 
that Had Been Skeptical 1 (2017), http://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/06/06-
26-17-Same-sex-marriage-release.pdf (showing 2011 as the first year in which more Americans favored 
same-sex marriage than disfavored it). 
 109.  Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014). 
 110.  For example, the series of federal court decisions on President Trump’s “travel bans.” See, e.g., 
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump 859 F.3d 741 
(9th Cir. 2017); Washington v. Trump 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 111.  See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (holding 
that Congress’ “for cause” restriction on the President’s removal power violates the separation of powers). 
But note, such issues may also be litigated in parliamentary systems. See, e.g., R v. Sec’y of State for 
Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 WLR 583 (appeal taken from Eng. and N. Ir.). 
 112.  See Stephen Gardbaum, Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review in 
Established Democracies (or Why Has the Model of Legislative Supremacy Mostly Been Withdrawn from 
Sale?), 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 613, 638 (2014) (describing the increased role of judicial review of substance 
of administrative actions in the UK). 
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and the Colombian Constitutional Court.  The growth of public interest 
litigation in the former, whereby the SCI has largely assumed managerial 
and governance functions in areas such as environmental protection, disaster 
relief, and sexual harassment, was a response to the deep and pervasive sense 
of government failure, inefficiency, and corruption in these areas.113  
Similarly, the Colombian Court’s attempts to solve certain major structural 
problems resulting in widespread rights violations through investigative 
hearings, managerial orders, and continuing oversight of government 
agencies for compliance has been ascribed to the dysfunctionality of the 
legislature, given the weakly institutionalized party system.114  A third 
example is South Africa, where the repeated failures of the national 
legislature to hold President Zuma accountable for using public money to 
improve his private home, as determined by the country’s Public Protector, 
prompted the Constitutional Court’s increasingly bold interventions, 
especially after the electoral evidence of declining support for the ANC was 
clear.115 Such dysfunctionalities often also in turn help to explain the 
comparatively higher public support for the courts than for the other state 
institutions that is sometimes recorded in opinion polls, which then becomes 
a new source of judicial power.116  By contrast, where the other branches of 
government are broadly functional, as arguably for example in Scandinavia, 
there is less need for courts to play such unorthodox roles so that this 
particular reason for, or spur to, judicial power does not exist. 
If this factor is one of several that involve the taking of power by courts, 
several recent influential accounts of the growth of judicial review have 
identified a different set of strategic political factors that involve the 
empowering of courts by other political actors and institutions.  These are 
that constitutional courts can act as “insurance policies” to political actors in 
transitioning authoritarian regimes newly faced with the uncertainties of 
future election results,117 as the last best hope of those who have lost their 
 
 113.  HANS DEMBOWSKI, TAKING THE STATE TO COURT: PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND THE 
PUBLIC SPHERE IN METROPOLITAN INDIA 56–61 (2001). It was also a response to The Emergency of 
1975–77. See infra text accompanying note 148. 
 114.  David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 319, 319–22 (2010). 
 115.  Woolman, supra note 99, at 1–6. 
 116.  See Bassok, supra note 75, at 573 (discussing public opinion polls as an “independent source 
of evidence” of public support of the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 117.  TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES 24–25 (2003). 
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“hegemonic” political position,118 or as mediating or “hedging” the transition 
to democracy by offering resistance to reversion to one-party rule.119 
Even within liberal democracies, the general political culture of a 
country (either alone or combined with some of the other factors discussed) 
may support a more robust or minimal role for courts—whether or not this 
culture is manifested in the relevant sets of formal legal powers.  Thus, for a 
long time different political cultures and histories in, say, the United States 
and Canada, or in Germany and the Netherlands, helped to explain their 
different constitutional arrangements with respect to courts and judicial 
review.  Today, political cultures that have changed at significantly 
differential rates concerning the continuing appeal of “parliamentary 
sovereignty” help to explain the different ways that courts and legislatures 
have exercised broadly similar “weak-form” powers under recent bills of 
rights in Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand.120 
Beyond purely political factors, the broader socio-economic context 
also undoubtedly plays a role in explaining the extent and scope of judicial 
power.  So, on the one hand, the widespread existence of extreme poverty 
may force itself onto the judicial agenda, especially where there is a 
transformational constitution and/or the other branches of government are 
viewed as dysfunctional or corrupt.  But on the other, a constitutional court 
in a wealthy advanced industrial society like Germany has options in terms 
of how social and welfare rights are judicially enforced that its counterpart 
in a far poorer country such as South Africa does not have.121 
 V.  CASE STUDIES 
In this section, I apply the somewhat abstracted, multidimensional 
evidentiary and explanatory factors listed above to two concrete case studies.  
Indeed, in so doing I hope to show that the Indian and Japanese supreme 
courts are particularly good examples of how the overall strength or 
weakness of a court is a function of all three broad categories of factors.  
 
 118.  RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 49 (2004). 
 119.  Sam Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO. L.J. 961, 1002 
(2011). 
 120.  The differences have also been explained by the legal form that the bills of rights have taken: 
constitutional or statutory. See Rivka Weill, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism 
Notwithstanding: On Judicial Review and Constitution-Making, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 127, 128–133 (2014). 
 121.  Here, I’m referring to the German Constitutional Court’s well-known position that implied 
social rights guarantee a minimum level of substantive state support, whereas the South African 
Constitutional Court has interpreted express social rights as not doing so but rather imposing a duty on 
the state to take reasonable measures in the relevant areas. 
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They also illustrate the role that political context in particular plays in 
explaining the extent of judicial power. 
   A.  The Indian Supreme Court 
The SCI is often viewed as one of the most powerful constitutional 
courts in the world.122  In the past three years alone it has issued a series of 
extraordinary and eye-catching rulings that bespeak a large and significant 
role in Indian society.  For example, in August 2017, a nine-judge bench 
unanimously declared a broad, fundamental right to privacy—ranging from 
gay sex to data mining—as an implication of the substantive rights to “life” 
and “personal liberty” that the Court has interpreted Article 21 to protect.123  
In January 2017, the SCI held that it was unconstitutional for political 
candidates to campaign on the basis of religion, caste, or ethnicity.124  In 
another case the same month, it forced the ouster of the head of the national 
cricket board, replacing him with former judges on an interim basis.125  In 
December 2016, the SCI mandated the playing of the national anthem in 
movie theaters under Article 51.126  In October 2015, it struck down a 
constitutional amendment establishing a judicial appointments commission 
to replace the collegium system for making senior appointments.127 
In many ways the SCI has powers that other constitutional courts can 
only dream about.  In addition to the standard power of judicial review of 
legislation granted by the text of the constitution,128 the SCI has essentially 
given itself at least three important and distinctive powers over the past forty 
years or so, relative to other constitutional courts.  This again reflects the 
constitutive importance of legal/judicial practice.  The first is the power to 
review the substance of constitutional amendments under the well-known 
basic structure doctrine.129  The subsequent “borrowing” of this doctrine in 
several countries, both elsewhere in South Asia and further afield,130 is a 
testament to its regional and international influence.  The second is the power 
 
 122.  See sources cited supra note 1. 
 123.  Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012 (2018) 1 SCC 
809 (India). 
 124.  Abhiram Singh v CD Commachen (2014) 14 SCC 382 (India). 
 125.  See Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bilhar (2015) 3 SCC 251 
(India). 
 126.  Shyam Narayan Chouksey v. Union of India (2016) 12 SCALE 404 (India). 
 127.  Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) 11 SCALE 1 
(India). 
 128.  INDIA CONST. art. 13, 132–35. 
 129. See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India) (first announcing and 
applying this power); Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SCR 206 (India) (subsequently strongly 
reaffirming this power). 
 130.  Arguably including, for example, Colombia.  See cases cited supra note 53. 
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to appoint its own members and that of the other higher courts under the 
collegium system, as determined by the SCI to be a requirement of judicial 
independence in the “Three Judges Cases” of 1982–1998 and affirmed in a 
2013 decision dismissing a case challenging it.131  Such a system of almost 
complete ex ante autonomy is rare for a constitutional court as compared 
with the global norm of either political appointments of various sorts or an 
independent, but not judicially-dominated, commission.132  In 2015, the SCI 
used the first power to prevent a change to this second, exemplifying how 
the basic structure doctrine can be used to prevent the normal possibility of 
overruling a constitutional court by constitutional amendment, and so 
entrenching its decisions.133  The third is the power to adjudicate public 
interest litigation (PIL), which has greatly enhanced public access to courts 
by essentially abolishing standing requirements and led to unorthodox 
judicial remedies overseeing and managing specific policymaking areas—
including pollution control and the environment, disaster relief, child 
employment, and sexual harassment.  In the latter, the SCI actually “made” 
the interim law by judicial order until Parliament acted.134  In this context, 
the SCI has been said to have effectively become an institution of 
governance.  In these three ways, the SCI has substantially enhanced both its 
autonomy and authority relative to its textually granted powers. 
On the other hand, the Indian Constitution also contains certain formal 
powers that reduce the power of the SCI relative to some other constitutional 
courts.  First, a relatively flexible constitutional amendment rule of two-
thirds of both houses of legislature,135 which has been triggered on 101 
occasions since 1950.  This is high by comparative standards, and the fact 
that many of these amendments were adopted to overrule decisions of the 
SCI prior to the 1980s was the primary reason the SCI responded by 
developing the basic structure doctrine.  Second, the Ninth Schedule to the 
Constitution, created by the very first such amendment (“the First 
Amendment”) in 1951, is an interesting and unusual constitutional provision 
that is functionally similar to the better-known Section 33 of the Canadian 
 
 131.  See S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (India); Supreme Courts Advocates-on-
Record Association v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268 (India); In re Special Reference 1, AIR 1999 SC 
1 (India); Suraz India Trust v. Union of India, (2012) 13 SCC 497 (India). 
 132.  It is slightly less rare for ordinary, nonconstitutional courts. 
 133.  See Landau & Dixon, supra note 39 at 611 (referring to this power as “super-strong judicial 
review”). 
 134.  See Vishaka & Others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 (India). 
 135.  INDIA CONST. art. 368 (“An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the 
introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each 
House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds 
of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President . . .”). 
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms,136 in that it was designed to immunize 
specific pieces of legislation from judicial review.  Unlike Section 33, 
however, it has been fairly frequently used (there are currently 284 Acts in 
the Ninth Schedule), but not since 1991.  Also unlike Section 33, its use (a) 
has been held by the SCI to be subject to substantive review under the basic 
structure doctrine, as per a landmark 2007 decision,137 and (b) requires the 
same two-thirds vote as a general constitutional amendment.  Third, the 
constitutional text mandates a judicial retirement age of 65.138  The practical 
bite of this provision depends on the typical age of appointment; but unlike, 
say, with political appointments in the US in which younger appointments 
are increasingly being made, the collegium system in which seniority plays 
a major role, ensures that younger judges are almost never appointed.  This 
combination of formal provision and legal practice affects the working of the 
SCI as a whole through its impact on individual justices.  As a result, there 
is fairly frequent turnover of both chief and associate justices, and less time 
and scope to develop either individual legacies or consistent collective 
positions. 
Another related aspect of legal practice that arguably reduces the power 
of the SCI relative to what it otherwise might be is the growing size of the 
court—from the original 8 members in 1950 to 31 today, making it one of 
the largest in the world—and the increasing tendency for it to sit in smaller 
and smaller panels—now typically of two or three justices—even in 
significant constitutional cases.139  Although both are a function of its 
increased jurisdiction and caseload with the effective abolition of standing 
requirements under PIL, and so reflect its greater role and authority, the 
diminishing panel size has caused concerns to be expressed about the Court’s 
doctrinal coherence and consistency.140  To the extent that the precedential 
effect of SCI decisions is weakened or questioned as a result, their 
consequential nature and its political power are reduced. 
 
 136.  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) 
(“Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the 
legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a 
provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15.”). 
 137.  I.R. Coehlo v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 (India); cf. Ford v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [1988] 2 S.C.R 712, 727 (Can.) (no substantive judicial review of use of section 33). 
 138.  INDIA CONST. art. 124(2). 
 139.  This is unusual in the common law world where supreme courts tend to sit in plenary sessions. 
 140.  See Madhav Khosla, The Problem, 642 SEMINAR 12, 13 (2013) (arguing that small bench 
decisions threaten the doctrine of precedent and the rule of law); see also Nick Robinson, Structure 
Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 
182–92 (2013). 
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Finally, any realistic assessment of the consequential nature of the SCI 
must take into account the general socio-economic context of India.  This 
means that despite its extensive powers, jurisdiction, and governance role, as 
with other branches of government in the country, it is often extremely 
difficult to translate institutional power and prestige into meaningful and 
tangible policy impact.  The sources of this deep structural recalcitrance are 
several.  First and foremost is the country’s massive population living at pre-
modern poverty levels, which in turn contributes enormously to a very low 
tax base and a hugely underfunded state.141  For example, these factors 
explain the absence of free, compulsory elementary education in India until 
2009: political opposition to compulsory education on the part of the mass 
of poor farmers who rely on their children as a source of free labor, and the 
lack of state funding to pay for it.142  If enacting the law was difficult enough, 
enforcing it—including through the courts—is even harder.  Bureaucratic 
inertia and corruption add a different dimension to the problem, as does the 
gap between the legal elite/system and the mass of the population,143 both 
manifested and compounded by the fact that the higher courts operate in a 
language (English) that most citizens do not understand. 
In terms of explanatory factors, it seems clear from both their debates 
and final text that the initial design choice of the Constituent Assembly, 
which sat from 1946 to 1949, was to create a somewhat more consequential 
constitutional court than was typical in the inherited English common law 
tradition at that time.  On the other hand, it also seems clear that the SCI has 
become more powerful in recent decades,144 in significant part through the 
addition and exercise of the three self-granted powers described above that 
were not envisaged or bestowed by the framers, so that deliberate design 
choice alone cannot explain its modern position.  Two features of general 
legal culture are, I believe, a necessary part of the story.  First, the status of 
judges in India is extraordinarily high, even by normal common law 
standards.  Again, ceteris paribus, this not only enhances the likelihood that 
courts will be consequential actors in the constitutional order, but also that 
power will accrete to them over time.  Second, and relatedly, even before the 
collegium system displaced prime ministerial appointment in 1993, there 
 
 141.   See, e.g., Kiran Stacey, India Shows Neighbours the Way Out of Tax Trap, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(May 18, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d3134d5a-4d17-11e8-8a8e-22951a2d8493. 
 142.  See, e.g., Krishna Kumat, Where Knowledge is Poor, THE HINDU (October 13, 2016), at 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Where-knowledge-is-poor/article11801428.ece. 
 143.  See Manoj Mate, Elite Institutionalism and Judicial Assertiveness in the Supreme Court of 
India, 28 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 361, 364–65 (2014) (referring to this gap as “elite 
institutionalism”). 
 144.  Manoj Mate, The Rise of Judicial Governance in the Supreme Court of India, 33 B.U. L. REV. 
169, 170 (2015). 
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was a strong culture and practice of non-political judicial appointments (with 
the notable exception of the Indira Ghandi era), which helped to establish the 
independence of the SCI as a political actor from the outset. 
But general political context plays perhaps the major role in explaining 
the changing contours of judicial power.  Indeed, India provides a 
paradigmatic example of the interplay of legal powers and political realities 
that both shape and explain the empirical power of constitutional courts.  For 
a key variable in the position of the SCI over the course of Indian 
constitutional history has been the presence or absence of a dominant 
political party within its parliamentary system of government.  During the 
first three and a half decades of Indian independence, the Congress Party was 
the dominant political force and its longstanding commitment to land reform 
and redistribution in favor of the poor resulted in near-continuous skirmishes 
with the courts’ defense of private property rights under the fundamental 
rights provisions of the Constitution.145  Although the SCI frequently ruled 
that land reform legislation was unconstitutional as providing insufficient 
compensation to owners, successive Congress Party governments were 
relatively easily able to respond by amending the Constitution, first by 
creating (and filling) the Ninth Schedule and later by removing the right to 
property,146 given the combination of the formal amendment rule of two-
thirds of both houses of the legislature and their political dominance at the 
time.  The SCI’s initial, albeit somewhat tentative, creation of the basic 
structure doctrine in 1973 was itself a response to this constitutional 
landscape.  It is certainly no coincidence that the perceived growth of judicial 
power in India coincided with the end of Congress Party dominance, as 
manifested in the rise of both PIL and the collegium system, as well as the 
Court’s strong and unanimous affirmation of the basic structure doctrine in 
1980.147  All three were also “political” responses of a court determined to 
regain its prestige in the eyes of the public after the low point of judicial 
power during the “Emergency” of 1975–77, when the SCI was widely 
perceived as having capitulated to the government’s assaults on 
 
 145.  The clash between the SCI and successive Congress Party governments over land reform and 
property rights was the most frequent and prominent source of friction, but not the only one.  The First 
Amendment itself also overruled SCI judgements protecting freedom of speech and holding that caste 
quotas in government-supported medical and engineering schools violated the constitutional right to 
equality. 
 146.  By the 44th Amendment to the Constitution of 1978, the rights to property contained in Articles 
19(1)(f) and 31 were removed from the category of Fundamental Rights in Part III and a diluted provision 
stating that “no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law” was inserted as Art. 
300A. 
 147.  Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789, 1811 (India). 
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constitutional liberties.148  Moreover, since the end of the Congress Party 
dominance and (thus far) the absence of a replacement, both constitutional 
amendment and use of the Ninth Schedule have become practically more 
difficult and relatively more rare; in response, the SCI has only infrequently 
employed its basic structure power, notwithstanding the recent instance. 
 B.  The Japanese Supreme Court 
By contrast with the SCI, the Japanese Supreme Court (SCJ) is widely 
seen as the paradigm of a weak or “conservative” court.149  The evidence 
usually given is that it has held statutes unconstitutional, in whole or part, 
only eight times in its history, although as suggested above in discussing 
both measures of power and alternative remedies, this figure does not 
necessarily tell the whole story and the SCJ has on a few other occasions 
protected rights by employing the technique of narrowly construing 
legislative provisions.150  More than the numbers alone, however, it is clear 
that the SCJ plays a relatively small role in the Japanese constitutional order, 
which is mostly enforced politically, rather than judicially.  For example, in 
all the discussions and controversies over the legitimacy and 
constitutionality of the Abe government’s July 2014 “reinterpretation” of 
Article 9, the “pacifist clause” of the constitution,151 to permit “collective 
self-defense” abroad in support of Japan’s allies for the first time, the almost 
complete silence concerning the role and potential future position of the SCJ 
on the issue speaks volumes.  No one appears to be waiting for, or expects, 
the SCJ to “resolve” the issue in the way, for example, almost everyone was 
in the United States on the question of same-sex marriage.  The question is 
why?  What factors explain its low profile? 
The answer surely isn’t legal powers, for the SCJ was largely modeled 
on the U.S. Supreme Court and broadly shares its formal authority, starting 
with the almost identical wording from Article III that “the whole judicial 
power” is vested in “a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are 
 
 148.  See, e.g., Mate, supra note 144, at 171 (discussing the reactionary nature of PIL to previous 
Supreme Court of India decisions). 
 149.  See generally Matsui, supra note 5. 
 150.  Matsui, supra note 15, at 149; Frank Upham, Stealth Activism: Norm Formation by Japanese 
Courts, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1493, 1496 (2011). 
 151.  See generally Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment and the 
“Reinterpretation” of Japan’s War Powers, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 427 (2017); Rosalind Dixon & Guy 
Baldwin, Globalizing Constitutional Moments? A Reflection on the Japanese Article 9 Debate, 74 
U.N.S.W. L. RES. SERIES (Jan. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Stephen 
Gardbaum, Constitutional Interpretation and Reinterpretation in Japan: The Case of Article 9 (2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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established by law.”152  Indeed, unlike the U.S. court, the SCJ’s powers of 
judicial review, which are also broadly similar to the contemporary norm for 
decentralized systems, are expressly contained in the text.153  Moreover, 
although the Japanese Constitution contains a more flexible formal 
amendment rule than the U.S. of two-thirds of both legislative chambers plus 
a simple majority in a popular referendum,154 it has never successfully been 
used.  Thus, a strong argument can be made that practically it is more 
difficult to amend; indeed one of the most difficult in the world.  Like the 
U.S. Constitution, it appears to have acquired semi-sacred status.  
Accordingly, the SCJ faces less prospect of being overruled via 
constitutional amendment than almost all other constitutional courts, 
including the U.S. (four such occasions in history) and German (several), 
and certainly the SCI, basic structure doctrine aside.  Although it is true that 
the life tenure provision of Article III was not adopted, in favor of a 
mandatory retirement age,155 the fact that none of the non-US candidates for 
“most powerful constitutional court in the world” have life tenure strongly 
suggests it is not an essential ingredient. 
 Two features of legal practice, in addition to the extremely infrequent 
use of its invalidation power and generally quite deferential posture towards 
the government acts it reviews, reduce the SCJ’s autonomy and authority 
relative to its formal powers.  First, more important than the age of 
mandatory retirement (seventy) is the (discretionary) age of appointment.  
Although the Judiciary Act sets a minimum age of 40, the practice has long 
been to appoint SCJ justices at the age of 64 or 65, which leaves them with 
relatively little time to grow into the job, develop their jurisprudence, or 
create a “legacy,” and obviously creates a high turnover rate with relatively 
little stability.156  Ceteris paribus, this practice undermines the autonomy and 
effectiveness of the SCJ as a coherent and consequential collective 
institution.  The second practice is the SCJ’s narrow interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction, in marked contrast to the SCI.  Thus, it has expressed a fairly 
broad understanding of “political questions” that deny it jurisdiction157 and 
a narrow reading of its standing rules even by U.S. standards, especially in 
suits against administrative agencies.158 
 
 152.  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76, para. 1 (Japan). 
 153.  Id. art. 81. 
 154.  Id. art. 96, para. 1. 
 155.  See Law, supra note 5, at 1559. 
 156.  See id. (discussing the importance of age in selecting judges). 
 157.  See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, Sho 34 (a) no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 3225 (Japan) (discussing the constitutionality of the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty and the violation of Article 9 with the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan). 
 158.  Matsui, supra note 5, at 1413–14. 
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Initial design choices do not appear to do much by way of explanation, 
as the SCJ is seemingly weaker than the legal powers granted to it by the 
constitutional drafters and approvers would suggest they intended.159  With 
respect to legal culture, it is well-known that Japan is close to the opposite 
end of the spectrum from the United States and Germany in terms of 
litigiousness and the use of law to resolve disputes, although whether this 
fact is best explained culturally, institutionally (for example, is the low 
number of lawyers per capita compared to the United States cause or effect?), 
or politically has been much debated.160  More importantly, and 
superimposed on this characteristic, as a predominantly civil law system, 
ordinary judges in Japan are career officials with relatively low status, and 
yet unlike most civil law countries it has adopted decentralized judicial 
review rather than centralizing the function in a specialist constitutional 
court with a separate appointments process.161  This relatively rare 
combination of decentralized judicial review and civil service, career 
judges—as distinct from either (1) decentralized review with a high status, 
second career judiciary or (2) centralized review with different appointments 
processes and outcomes—is a recipe for weakness/deference.  The Nordic 
countries are among the few to share it. 
The key feature of political context that both shapes and helps to explain 
judicial power, is the long-dominant position of the LDP, which has only 
twice been out of power since 1946 and only then for short periods.162  This 
dominance means that the LDP has appointed almost all members of the SCJ.  
Moreover, because (unlike in India) there is no longstanding practice of non-
political appointments, prime ministers have complete discretion on whom 
to appoint and have mostly exercised it in favor of party loyalists, typically 
either from the hierarchical, civil service judiciary or the ranks of senior 
government lawyers.163  Although there is a convention for the Chief Justice 
 
 159.  These were the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) (i.e., General MacArthur) 
and the two houses of the Japanese Diet. 
 160.  See generally Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN 
JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur Von Mehrem ed., 1963) (classic cultural 
explanation); John Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978) 
(institutional explanation); Mark J. Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in 
Japan, 14 J. JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988) (institutional explanation); Takao Tanase, The Management of 
Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 651 (1990) (political 
explanation). 
 161.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 1, 1950, Sho 23 (re) no. 141, 4-2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 73 (Japan) (holding that not only the Supreme Court but all lower courts have the 
power of judicial review); see Matsui, supra note 5, at 1379 (discussing limited judicial review). 
 162.  Since its foundation in 1955, the LDP has been in power continuously, except for 1993–94 and 
2009–12. 
 163.  See Tushnet & Dixon, supra note 35, at 113–14 (for another account that also emphasizes the 
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to recommend replacements, the recommendations—if accepted—are 
usually of those not expected to be a source of concern or independent-
minded action.164  As noted above, by appointing justices at a relatively 
advanced age, usually only five or six years before their mandatory 
retirement, LDP prime ministers have further enhanced their political control 
and manipulation of the SCJ.  To the extent the system seeks independent-
mindedness on legal/constitutional issues, it is mostly conducted within the 
executive branch by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), an expert source 
of legal counsel broadly modeled on the Conseil d’État in France.165  The 
CLB has largely displaced the SCJ as the primary interpreter of the 
Constitution, for the SCJ usually defers to its view, perhaps reflecting a 
larger political/legal cultural preference for bureaucratic professionalism 
rather than judicial power. 
In sum, on paper, the textual provisions establishing and empowering 
the SCJ provide little basis for predicting its actual position in the Japanese 
constitutional system.  Although its conservatism can be exaggerated, neither 
its own judicial practice nor constitutional practice more broadly afford it a 
particularly consequential role in the resolution of significant issues.  This 
overall weakness of the SCJ stems from the juxtaposition of the relatively 
low status of the ordinary judiciary with decentralized judicial review, and 
especially from the political context of a dominant party without 
constitutional or other effective protection for impartial judicial 
appointments, rather than lack of legal powers or deliberate design choice. 
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the proper measure of the power of a 
constitutional court is its consequential nature as an institutional actor in 
terms of constitutional and policy outcomes, relative to the other institutional 
actors in that polity.  Although more diffuse and harder to quantify, this 
conception of judicial power is more inclusive and realistically nuanced than 
commonly employed uni-dimensional alternatives such as international 
influence or strike-down rate.  The consequential nature of a constitutional 
court is a function of three broad categories or types of variable: formal rules 
and powers; legal and judicial practice; and the immediate political context 
in which it operates.  Through a process of mutual interaction, each of these 
 
importance of the dominant position of the LDP in understanding—functionally—”weak-form” judicial 
review in Japan). 
 164.  See Law, supra note 5, at 1550−51 (discussing recommendations by the Chief Justice). 
 165.  Sometimes the government does not seek an independent view, as when it essentially bypassed 
the CLB in order to “reinterpret” Article 9 as permitting collective self-defense by Cabinet resolution in 
July 2014. 
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three helps to shape and constitute the more specific components of a court’s 
institutional power, which include the nature, scope, and content of the 
constitution it enforces, the jurisdictional and remedial powers it has and 
employs, the ease or difficulty of constitutional amendment, and its 
composition and tenure.  As we have seen, following Brinks and Blass,166 
these multiple components of judicial power can usefully (although 
somewhat underinclusively) be grouped into autonomy and authority, but the 
extent of a constitutional court’s autonomy and authority is the product of all 
three broad categories. 
Sometimes a particular factor that helps to shape the extent of a 
constitutional court’s autonomy or authority—and hence its power—also 
helps to explain it.  For example, the LDP’s ability as a dominant party to 
control appointments to the SCJ both reduces its autonomy and partly 
explains its weakness as a constitutional court.  Here, political context 
overlaps as both an evidentiary and an explanatory factor, so there is 
certainly no watertight, mutually exclusive division between the two.  But, 
as we have seen, legal culture also contributes a separate, more wholly 
explanatory reason for the weakness of the court and the infrequent use of 
its powers.  Moreover, the role of politics is not always as direct and 
immediate, so as to enhance or reduce the power of a court, but is frequently 
more genuinely contextual and explanatory in terms of creating or limiting 
opportunities and political space for a constitutional court.  Measurement and 
explanation are more fully and uniformly distinct tasks when we ask, not 
about why a constitutional court fails to use or rarely uses its granted powers 
(as this also implicates the extent of its autonomy/authority and whether it 
can be considered a powerful court), but such questions as, for example, why 
a given court’s power has changed over time.  The broad categories of 
explanatory factors suggested are deliberate constitutional design choices, 
legal culture, and more general political context. 
This Article has the fundamentally second-order goal of helping to 
advance and refine a framework for thinking about the cluster of issues that 
involve or engage with notions of the power or strength of constitutional 
courts.  As such, and notwithstanding its two case studies, it necessarily 
paints with a broad brush.  If it succeeds in moving the ball forward at all, 
this will be through future fine-grained studies that, by telling us more about 
either particular (evidentiary or explanatory) factors or particular courts, fill 
in more of the details of the picture sketched here. 
 
 
 166.  See Brinks & Blass, supra note 4, at 296 (describing their three-dimensional framework of ex 
ante autonomy, ex post autonomy, and authority). 
